This paper examines the pricing and performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) for small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the Thai Market for Alternative Investments (MAI) from September 2001 to October 2008. Underpricing is calculated using headline underpricing, underpricing issuer loss, underpricing loss by market value, and underpricing loss by issuer price. Aftermarket performance employs monthly cumulative abnormal returns, buy-and-hold returns, and wealth relatives. The underpricing results show respective average underpricing of 12.69%, 5.01%, 4.74% and 11.40% for the measures used. This is significantly lower than the underpricing found for the large-firm IPOs listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). However, there is much variability in pricing over the sample period, with substantial underpricing in 2003/04, and correctly priced issues on average in 2001/02 and 2005/06/07. While the performance analysis is suggestive that SMEs perform well after listing, returns adjusted for market performance indicates that this generally only holds up until the second year after listing.
Introduction
In Thailand and elsewhere, small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important mechanism for economic development and growth. This is because SMEs play a significant role in selling their own products in the form of finished goods and services. At the same time, they also act as subcontractors or suppliers of materials and are a major component of Following the 1996 economic crisis in Thailand, many businesses closed or downsized.
One government response to reinvigorate economic activity was to provide support to SMEs through the provision of advice and financial assistance, the promotion of entrepreneurship, and the recognition and creation of new markets. Starting in 2000, the Thai government enacted legislation for the central purpose of assisting, promoting, and developing SMEs in Thailand. The government created several offices to facilitate this process. These include the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion, the Institute for Small and Medium Enterprises Development, and the transformation of the Small Industry Finance Cooperation to the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand. Several financial institutions, including state-owned and commercial banks, also provided renewed support by the provision of credit facilities and advice to SMEs. However, evidence elsewhere, especially in Taiwan, Japan and Germany, suggests that close cooperation between the public and private sectors is also required to systematically address some of the areas of shortcomings faced by SMEs, including in marketing, labour supply, production technology, management, access to public services, and especially, a shortage of capital.
Access to capital markets, especially equity, is a major requirement for the sustainability and ongoing development of the SME sector itself, and ultimately the evolution of at least some SMEs into larger, globally competitive enterprises. Unfortunately, this is where SMEs suffer an acute disadvantage through the lack of critical size, liquidity, information asymmetry, and the lack of suitable markets. Importantly, initial public offerings (IPO) on organised exchanges are an important step in the lifecycle of new and start-up firms and provides important opportunities for access to new capital and the cashing out of entrepreneurs, private equity, and venture capitalists alike. However, many economies lack formalised exchanges accessible to SMEs. Nonetheless, even where exchange-traded opportunities exist for SMEs, as in Thailand, there is still some uncertainty about the ongoing firm performance needed to sustain these markets, and more importantly, their effectiveness in appropriately pricing the issuance of primary securities.
The purpose of this paper is to study the pricing and performance of the IPOs for SMEs listed on Thailand's MAI. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the development, structure, and operations of the MAI. Section 3 provides a review of the literature on IPO underpricing and performance. Section 4 presents the methodology and Section 5 explains the empirical results. Some concluding remarks are in Section 6.
Thai IPO market for SMEs
The MAI, the sister bourse of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), was established under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act on November 11, 1998, with operations officially commencing on June 21, 1999 and trading starting on September 17, 2001. The launch of the MAI represented a significant step in the development of the Thai capital market, and originally aimed at providing opportunities for SMEs to access long-term capital for business expansion. More recently, the MAI has focused on the subset of young, high-growth, innovative and knowledge-based SMEs. Here, as elsewhere, the MAI's purpose is not only to create new fund-raising opportunities for innovative business with high growth potential, but also to provide a greater range of investment alternatives for Thai and international investors. 
Literature review
One of the more puzzling phenomena in finance is the underpricing of new stock issues.
There are various explanations for this, including information asymmetry, signalling relationships, cyclical behaviour, and third-party certification. Foremost among these, the information asymmetry hypothesis sees underpricing as an equilibrium occurrence when investors are disproportionately informed. As uninformed investors face the consequences of poor judgement when other investors are better informed, underpricing arises to compensate uninformed investors for the risk of ending up with a less successful IPO.
Underpricing is clearly a concern for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and private equity investors, since it reduces the amount received by going public. However, one argument is that the extent of the entrepreneurs' concerns is limited to the influence on their net wealth. Costly action, such as employing reputable underwriters, is undertaken only where advantageous. In general, as the proportion of the company going public escalates, the existing investors in the firm attempt to reduce underpricing at an increasing rate. When informed investors believe an issue is overpriced, they discard the investment opportunity and seek issues elsewhere that are not overpriced.
An alternative rationale for underpricing is that the value of an issue depends on market demand and the selling efforts of underwriters. In general, the underwriter is typically aware of demand levels, more so than the issuer. As such, the issue price is set below its 'true value' to increase interest. Similarly, the issuer is more informed then potential investors. In an attempt to resolve problems with asymmetric information, the underwriter signals the true value of the firm by underpricing the securities and acquires a percentage of the shares. The retention of shares comes as a signalling device to the market-the higher the withholding, the higher the return expected. Other work draws attention to the signalling relationship between the issuer's fractional holding of the firm's equity and the expected future cash flows. In response to these and other theoretical developments, a body of empirical research has arisen, largely in the US, concluding that IPOs are indeed underpriced [see, most recently, , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Hunt-McCool et al. (1996) , Habib and Ljungqvist (1998; 2001) , Francis and Hasan (2001) , Bradley and Jordan (2002) , Loughran and Ritter (1995; ].
Relatively fewer studies concern IPO (under)pricing in Thailand, with all extant work focusing only on the SET, the exchange for large IPOs [Wethyavivorn and Koo-Smith (1991) , Allen et al. (1999) , Lonkani (2000) and Lonkani and Firth (2005) , Chorruk and Worthington (2010) , Aumeboonsuke and Tangjitprom (2012) , Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) ]. For example, Wethayavivorn and Koo-Smith (1991) studied 32 IPOs over the period 1988-89 and found that the average initial return was 56.73%. Similarly, using a sample of 150 IPOs from 1985 to 1992, Allen et al. (1999) reported that the average initial return for Thai IPOs was 63.49 percent, while Lonkani (2000) concluded that the average initial return was 46.70 percent using a sample of 292 IPOs from 1987 to 1997. Generally, and in common with evidence from developed markets, these studies provide evidence that large IPOs in Thailand are also substantially underpriced. This is perhaps best summarised by the results in Chorruk and Worthington (2010) , who the presence of underpricing in the order of 5-17% for SET IPOs over the period 1997 to 2008.
In terms of performance, most of the extant work concurs with work in the US by Moonchul and Ritter (1999) that post-IPO firms generally underperform as investors are overly optimistic about their potential when listed. However, Loughran and Ritter (1995) counter that underperformance is not a unique trait of IPOs rather a result of IPO firms being small with low book-to-market values. There are just a few recent studies of Thai IPO performance, including Allen et al. (1999) and Kim et al (2004) . Allen et al (1999) , for instance, studied 150 IPO listed on the SET from 1985 to 1992 and uncovered evidence of poor short-run aftermarket performance: the average market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return at the end of the listing month was -2.9 percent (t-value = 2.18). Nevertheless, they find no evidence for poor long-run performance up to 36 months after the IPO (with the exception of the first two months). Indeed, the average market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return at the end of a 36-month period is 10.02 percent, though not statistically significant.
However, when outliers are removed from cross-sectional analysis, there is still the suggestion that Thai IPOs may underperform on average in the long run. Moreover, aftermarket returns are higher with value-weighted adjustment of the benchmark suggesting that smaller firms have better performance. Once again, the aftermarket performance of Thai IPOs is similar to Wethyavivorn and Koo-smith (1991) but contrasts with Ritter (1991) , Levis (1993) , Aggarwal et al. (1993) and Allen and Patrick (1994) . Kim et al. (2004) also suggest evidence of a long-term decline in operating performance for IPO firms in Thailand using a sample of 133 SET IPOs from 1987 to 1993. However, most recently, Chorruk and Worthington (2010) find evidence of higher performance for the two years after the IPO on the SET and underperformance only thereafter. Therefore, this paper is the first study of IPO pricing and performance using a sample of SMEs listed on the MAI.
Data and method
The existing literature on the pricing and performance suggests two board hypotheses for each study as follows. First, in terms of pricing, we hypothesise that the IPOs for SMEs are underpriced. Second, in terms of performance, we hypothesise that the IPOs for SMEs underperform post-listing. In order to test the first hypothesis, four complementary measures of underpricing are calculated: headline underpricing, underpricing issuer loss, underpricing loss by market value, and underpricing loss by issue price (Habib and Ljungqvist 1998; Silva Rosa et al. 2003) . To test the second hypothesis, we calculate monthly average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and wealth relatives (WR).
Sample selection and data sources
For the pricing analysis, the sample comprises 53 of the total 55 common stock IPOs 
Measures of underpricing
The four underpricing measures used in this study are adapted from Habib and Ljungqvist (1999) , Silva Rosa et al. (2003) , and Chorruk and Worthington (2010) . While not previously applied to SMEs, we argue that these measures nonetheless well reflect the nature of underpricing in SMEs. The only possible difference is that founding and/or family shareholders traditionally hold SMEs very closely, even after the IPO, and so the proportion of free float in these measures will typically be less than that for a large firm IPO. However, as shown in the calculations below, other than the basic headline underpricing measure, the calculations used adjust for shares held by strategic (pre-IPO) shareholders and firm size so the measures of underpricing obtained are comparable for any size IPO (including SMEs).
First, headline underpricing (UPH) is a traditional measure of underpricing:
where P c is the closing price on the first day of trading and P i is the issue price of the company i. Second, underpricing issuer loss (UPIL) determines the loss to the issuer per share: 
We calculate the four underpricing measures in Equations (1)- (4) for each firm in the sample. The mean and median values for the IPOs listed on the SET are also compiled.
Finally, a value-weighted measure of each underpricing measures is calculated using:
where UP i is UPSTD, UPIL, UPLMV and UPLIP, respectively. This measure of underpricing takes into account a firm's size relative to the level of underpricing.
Measures of post-IPO performance
The methodology used to measure IPO performance follows Ritter (1991) , Brav and Gromper (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) in the use of monthly (1) cumulative average returns (CARs), (2) buy-and-hold returns (BHRs), and (3) wealth relatives (WR).
We calculate the CARs in the following manner. First, the raw returns for company i in event month t is measured as follows:
where R it is the monthly raw return for the company i in event month t where the starting price for each company is its last price for the month of listing, excluding the initial return, P c is the closing price on the first month of listing, P i is issue price of the company i. The monthly raw returns for each IPO company are for months 1 to 36 or until delisting or the end of the observation period. We define event months as months following the listing month.
Second, the benchmark return for company i is calculated the same way as the raw return over the same period as following:
where bencht R is the monthly benchmark return on company I, P c-bench is the closing price of the benchmark on the first listing month and P i-bench is the closing price of the benchmark on the previous month. Third, benchmark adjusted returns are the difference between the raw return of company i and the return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period.
Fourth, the average benchmark adjusted return for month t on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t defined as it AR . This is the value-weighted arithmetic mean of the benchmark- 
Finally, to assess whether the cumulative average benchmark adjusted returns are significantly different from zero, studentised t-tests for cumulative average benchmark adjusted returns are calculated as:
where σ is the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns and n is the number of IPOs.
We calculate the BHRs using the following series. First, the buy-and-hold return for the company i, denoted as BHR it , excluding the initial return on the first trading day, is:
Second, the benchmark buy-and-hold return, denoted as BHR bencht , is calculated in the same way as the buy-and-hold return for company i.
Third, the benchmark-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for each company are it BHAR . We calculate this by deducting from the buy-and-hold return for company i the return of benchmark portfolio as follows:
Fourth, the average buy-and-hold return for period t, denoted as it BHAR , is the arithmetic mean abnormal return on all IPOs in the sample of size n:
Finally, a positive (negative) value of BHAR indicates that IPOs outperform (underperform) the benchmark portfolio. To test whether the average buy-and-hold return is significantly different from zero, a t-test is calculated as:
where σ is the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns
The final measure of IPO performance is the wealth relatives from the three-year buyand-hold returns. We define these as the ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of issues to the end-of-period wealth from holding a benchmark portfolio, given by:
A wealth relative greater (less) than one indicates that the IPOs over performed (underperformed) the benchmark portfolio. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Aggarwal et al (1993 ) Ritter (1991 , Allen and Patrick (1994) and Allen et al. (1999) that the larger the gross proceeds, the higher initial underpricing. Generally, this would imply that the owners of medium-sized SMEs suffer more from "money left on the table" during the IPO process than the owners of small and large-sized SMEs.
Empirical results

Underpricing
<TABLE 2 HERE>
Post-IPO performance
Figure 2 graphs the monthly average raw return, benchmark-adjusted return and cumulative benchmark-adjusted return for the 53 IPOs included in the sample up to 36 months. Most critically, the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return is always above zero until month 36.
This suggests that Thai IPOs outperform the market benchmark. Table 3 provides additional details on the benchmark-adjusted returns and cumulative benchmark-adjusted returns. underpricing loss by issuer price, while aftermarket performance is measured using monthly cumulative abnormal returns, buy-and-hold returns, and wealth relatives. As far as the authors are aware, this is one of very few studies of IPO pricing and performance in Thailand, and the only study to concern IPOs in the SME-orientated MAI market. SMEs account for most of the underpricing observed. These findings contrast strongly with Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Aggarwal et al. (1993 ) Ritter (1991 , Allen and Patrick (1994) , and Allen et al. (1999) , amongst others, that underpricing is relatively more severe in smaller IPOs. Indeed, the evidence largely suggests that Thai companies listing on the MAI are appropriately priced on issue and do not suffer from the underpricing so prevalent in many developed and emerging markets. In terms of performance, there is likewise very little evidence to suggest that the behaviour of listed SMEs, at least in Thailand, is any different from the market as a whole. While some measures of return performance are suggestive, SMEs only selectively outperform the market in their second year, after which their performance is indistinguishable for their compatriots.
Of course, some limitations in this study indicate that we should treat these findings with at least some caution. The first major limitation is that the monthly MAI index used for the market benchmark is only available after 2003. The only alternative available for this period was the SET index, and as this draws on larger, more mature firms, it may be an unsuitable benchmark of performance for small, younger firms. A second limitation is that no industry indexes are currently available for the MAI. This means that some interesting insights using industry benchmarks are obtainable. Finally, as a new market we were only able to study the MAI over a short sample period. This may mean the results are subject to relatively shortterm impacts (for example, hot and cold markets, macroeconomic shocks) that limit our ability to extend our findings more generally over time. Number of IPOs in brackets. Small-sized issues -gross proceeds less than 300 million baht, Medium-sized issues -gross proceeds between 300 and 600 million baht, Large-sized issues -gross proceeds greater than 600 million baht. UPH -headline underpricing, UPIL -underpricing issuer loss, UPLMVunderpricing loss by market value, and UPLIP -underpricing loss by issue price. tstatistics and p-values are tests of null hypothesis that means are equal to zero. Notes: Small-sized issues -gross proceeds less than 300 million baht, Medium-sized issues -gross proceeds between 300 and 600 million baht, Large-sized issues -gross proceeds greater than 600 million baht. Small-sized issues -gross proceeds less than 300 million baht, Medium-sized issues -gross proceeds between 300 and 600 million baht, Large-sized issues -gross proceeds greater than 600 million baht. Small-sized issues -gross proceeds less than 300 million baht, Medium-sized issues -gross proceeds between 300 and 600 million baht, Large-sized issues -gross proceeds greater than 600 million baht.
